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DICKINSON LAW REVIEV
conversions are committed under just these circumstances, and it is no defense to
say that there was an intention to reimburse the owner.' 8 It is the fact that
the defendant uses the property of another, even though temporarily, for his
own or some other's benefit without the owner's consent which makes his con-
duct criminal.' 9 If he converts the property, knowing his act to be wrong,
he is guilty irrespective of his intention as to making right his wrong. Nor is it
a defense to say that the owner later ratified the conversion. Once having,
with criminal intent, used another's property, the offense has been committed,
and ratification will not make it less criminal.
While the intent of the accused must be criminal, the intent of the
'prosecutor or the owner is immaterial. In the case of Com. v. Gartman"0 the
defendant attempted to justify his conduct and criminal intent by pointing to
the prosecutor's illegal purpose. The prosecutor had given the defendant a
large sum of money with which to buy "bootleg" liquor, and the defendant
absconded with the money. This fact, however, did not exempt the defendant
from the operation of the statute. An illegal intention on the part of the
owner of the property does not make the wrongful intention of the accused
less criminal.
H. L. Weary
RIGHT OF PARENT TO SUE CHILD FOR CHILD'S NEGLIGENCE,
TN PET NNSYLVANIA
An action may not be maintained by a parent against an unemancipated
child for personal injuries of the parent resulting from the negligence of the
child. Duffy v. Duffy. 117 Pa. Super. 500, April 15, 1935.
By this case Pennsylvania adopts the conservative view. There are three
other cases in which this question arose.' In only one jurisdiction may the
parent sue the child in this situation. 2 It is interesting to note that in all four
of these cases the plaintiff-parent was the mother.
The reasons advanced by the Pennsylvania court are threefold: (1) in
the converse situation, the great weight of authority will not permit an
48Com.. v. Meile, 115 Pa. Super. 269.
49Com. v. Gilliam, 82 Pa. Super. 75.
5083 Pa. Super. 108.
lCrosby v.. Crosby, 230 App. Div. 651, 246 N. Y. S. 384, (1930); Schneider v.
Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498, (1930); Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W. (2d.) 109, (Mo.,
1932).
SW41s v. WeU 48 S.W. (2d.) 109, (Mo. 1932).
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unemancipated minor to sue his parent for personal injuries of the child re-
sulting from the negligence of the parent; (2) the public policy is to prevent
rather than to promote "discord in the home, disorganization of the family
relation, and the severing of the natural ties of affection" which "are apt
to follow"; and, (3) the parent is the natural guardian of the child,-" 'The
ordinary position of parent and guardian of a minor, and that of a plaintiff
seeking to recover from the minor, are positions which cannot both be occupied
by one person at one and the same time.' -3
The Duffy case cites Crosby v Crosby, 246 N. Y. S. 384, as a similar
case in which recovery was denied. In the Crosby case, however, the parent's
judgment against the minor child was reversed because the trial court had
refused to admit the defendant's plea that no cause of action existed in favor
of the plaintiff because the defendant was an infant.
The Duffy case also cites LoGalbo v. Lo Galbo, 246 N.Y.S. 565, as a similar
case in which recovery was denied. But in the Lo Galbo case the
father's administratrix, his widow and the mother of the defendant, was per-
mitted to sue the minor child for two reasons: (1) the child was emancipated,
and (2) "it is a matter of common knowledge that a great proportion of
owners of automobiles are protected against damages by insurance," which
abrogates the old reason of non-suability based on public policy.
The Lo Galbo case and other authorities4 consider the element of insur-
ance contracts usually maintained by automobile operators;5 but the Pennsylvania
court disposed of this factor by stating that "without a legislative mandate, we
see no justification for making such a discrimination, thus segregating auto-
mobile cases from other actions by a parent growing out of the negligent
conduct of an unemancipated minor, because in many automobile cases in-
surance might be carried that would give protection. That distinction has
never been recognized in any of the decisions called to our attention, and we
refuse . . to adopt such a theory."
The opposite view is maintained in Wells v. Wells,6 which held that
a parent may sue a minor child in tort. The Pennsylvania court distinguishes
the Wells case on the ground that that case is based on an earlier case in the
3The court here is quoting Schneider v. Schneider. 160 Md. 18, 152" A. 498, (1930).
4Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Mar-
chand, 4 D. L. R. 157, S. C. R. 86, 15 B. R. C 1135, (Can.); Dunlap v. Dunlap,
N. H., 150 A. 905; Goheen v. Goheen, 9 N. J. Misc. Rep. 507, 154 A. 393; Lund
v. Olson, 183 Mian. 515, 237 N. W. 188; Belleson v. Skilbeck, 185 Minn. 537, 242
N. W. 1; Canen v. Kraft, 41 Ohio App. 120; 43. Harv. L. R. 1030, 1074; 44 Hamy.
L. R. 135; 79 U. Pa. L. R. 649; 16 Cornell L. Q. 286; 33 Columbia L. R. 360; 13
Boston U. L. R. 357, 361; 1 Duke B. A. J. 51.
SAIl of these parent versus, child cases have arisen from negligence alleged on the
part of the child in operating an automobile.
648 S W. (24) 109, (Mo. 1932).
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same state, and that the earlier case is to be differentiated because the in-
fant plaintiff was suing a person who stood in loco parentis. Nevertheless
the Wellr case does permit a natural parent to sue an unemancipated minor
child for the infant's negligence in an automobile accident. The Wells case
represents the liberal view. It answers the public policy contention by assert-
ing that there is a general rule which permits a parent to bring a suit concern-
ing property against a minor child 7 and that a suit concerning property in-
troduces no more antagonism in the parent-child relationship than a suil. based
on personal injuries.$
Richard R. Wolfrom
7 See McKern v. Beck, 126 N..E. 641, (Ind., 1920).
sSee Titman v. Titman, 64 Pa. 480. (1870). a suit arising from a contract
between parent and minor child.
